

Oral History

Q: This is our interview for the Central Arizona Project (CAP) with Stewart Udall. It is October 14, 2003. Let's start with a little bit of background on you. Tell me a little bit about your early life and how important water was to you as...

Stewart Udall (A):

I grew up on the Colorado Plateau on the little Colorado River, which was little but dams were important, irrigation was important, the way I grew up I knew the importance of water and how valuable it was and how droughts could come and so on. I spent my time with a team of horses as a teenager plowing fields, irrigating fields, that was part of your education so you lived close to the land. Water was important, gardens were important, animals were important. That was the way I lived. I think that served me well when I become a congressman, Secretary of Interior, because I knew how important resources were to people.

Q: Just for the record, tell me where you were born and when and stuff like that.

A: I was born in St. Johns, Arizona, where my father was born and where my grandfather as a young man was a pioneer. And that's on the Colorado plateau that's part of the Colorado River system, although we were up in the hills away from the main stem of the Colorado River.

Q: When is the first time you heard of the CAP?

A: As a congressman, well, I guess I read about it before because Ernest McFarland, who was a senator, and Carl Hayden in 1951 got the bill through the Senate and California succeeded in creating a blockade and they couldn't get it out of the House and then California was saying, "well Arizona's water rights aren't determined, they have got to go to the Supreme Court." They were able to force Arizona to spend what became 10 years in a legal battle which Arizona won and of course, in the meantime California is using most of Arizona's water because

they were taking all the water they could take into Southern California for their growth and development projects.

Q: When you first became aware more of just reading about the CAP, but you became aware as someone who might have to make some kind of decision about, what was your first impression of the CAP?

A: Well, the...when I became a congressman, Arizona only had two congressmen, John Rhodes and I. And we became great friends the rest of our lives and we were both on the Interior Committee and our big job was to see that ultimately that Arizona got its water project as part of a whole plan for the Colorado River system. Of course, while we were there, while I was there the six years in the 1950s, Arizona was waiting on this Supreme Court decision. They had appointed a master, this court proceeding went on and on and mostly at that point we were making friends, and trying to make friends and influence people on the committee because we knew it would be a huge undertaking for Arizona with two congressmen to get a bill through the House of Representatives with 435 members of congress.

Q: Arizona was so small, were you surprised at how effective Arizona actually was in getting a lot of this stuff through?

A: Well, we were very conscious of the fact that California was a political powerhouse. They must have had 28 members of congress, Arizona had two. They were loaded up on the Interior Committee and we felt, for good reasons, that California would do everything they could to slow down the process, to obstruct it. They had done that with the upper Colorado project and Craig Hosmer who was a member of the committee, he was a pretty slick operator, he used to put in, during the final depth Colorado project things in the congressional record every day and the theme was "would you invest in water to grow bananas on Pike's Peak." What he was saying and that was the Metropolitan Water District of California speaking through him is "well these upper basin states they have all of

these little high mountain projects up at 6-7-8,000 feet and they can't grow anything that is viable product that can be sold. You know Southern California, we have orchids, we have avocados, we have all the rest of this and why are these people trying to get congress to appropriate money and that was the atmosphere in the House on the Interior committee when John Rhodes and I were in there in the 50s.

Q: Was California the biggest one, the opponent to the CAP?

A: Yes, California it was really a "coup" when Herbert Hoover brought the states together and worked out the Santa Fe Compact. Which of course Arizona didn't agree to for 20 years, but getting the Santa Fe Compact, getting the Hoover Dam authorized, and it not only produced electricity for Southern California they were going to take a huge quantity of water and that project made it possible. So, of course, that put California, Southern California, in a position where as long as they could delay the development of projects by the Upper Basin States and Arizona and Nevada, as long as it could be delayed, they just had a free ride. They could take all the water that they could take out of the system they created for Southern California and that was a big strategy and of course we knew because that was the history. They had blocked Arizona in 1951 when they tried to get the project through, the CAP though, they had blocked it and we just knew it would be difficult to get California to go along and not oppose in a major way, the CAP.

Q: They were obviously strong enough that they could do that. They were obviously strong enough that they could delay, they could...

A: The thing you have to understand, California was becoming the most popular state in the union. That happened in 1966, by the way, but they had twenty-odd congressman, 30, 40...and they had the largest delegation in the House and that would if you could get all of California congressman to pull together, they were very formidable. One of the jobs I undertook as Secretary of Interior was to break down the unity of California. Working with Governor Pat Brown and I knew of

course a lot of the congressman from northern California and if they were opposed we could split up and dilute the political power that California had in the House.

Q: Is that what ultimately happened then because of this strategy that finally CAP was able to get through?

A: Well, when I became the Secretary of Interior, I was the first cabinet member to be invited to be in the President's cabinet in history. I knew because California was so politically powerful that I was going to have to work the leaders of California, Pat Brown, the new governor (he was from northern California). I had worked with Senator Engle, he was chairman of the House Committee, and John Rhodes and I tried to make friends with the Northern California people. Well with the Southern California people too, but we knew there was a hard core that would always oppose any Arizona water project. So it was my job, as I saw it, to handle my job as Secretary of Interior so that the California people, a lot of the leaders, would go along with Arizona when our time came.

Q: Did your thinking of the way you approached CAP have to change from the congressman to when now, you are the Secretary of Interior for the entire country?

A: Well, of course it had to change as a congressman. I am an Arizona congressman and that's my main interest and so on. As Secretary of Interior, I was in charge of the whole west and I had an opportunity to make friends and influence people that I hadn't had as a member of the House because now I had Senator Jackson from Washington, very powerful, Senator Anderson from Nevada, the chairman of the committee, kind of a mentor of mine, so I had an opportunity to not only just represent Arizona, but do it in such a way that they wouldn't regard me as an Arizona Secretary of Interior but as a western Secretary of Interior. Then we began working on projects in the east and the department, we made a lot of friends all

over the country. The conservation programs of the 1960s were very popular and I think I achieved a major popularity in the country as a whole during that period.

Q: Maybe had a little bit of opposition from Arizona though, they expected you just to stay in Arizona right?

A: I don't think some of the Arizona people, particularly the ones who wanted to build the two dams in the Grand Canyon, fully appreciated my position, what I was trying to do and the fact that I had to make compromises to make it easy for Arizona to get its project. I was almost kind of on a tightrope between being a national Secretary of Interior and being perceived as somebody whose main mission in life was to get an Arizona water project. I had my own problems in that office that I think some Arizona people didn't fully appreciate.

Q: My research and everything has shown that it took like actually from the time they first came up with the idea of the CAP until it was finally approved, 50 years. That is such an incredible amount of time to be persistent enough to stay with it and also...

A: The Arizona people, I think, preceding the Santa Fe compact in 1922, had this vision of developing water. You know, the most successful irrigation project, Reclamation project, off all times, since Teddy Roosevelt started the program, in my opinion, is Salt River Project (SRP). The SRP involved bringing irrigation canals and developing agriculture. You know, you have in southern Arizona the best growing season in the United States. You can grow cotton and grow other crops for 11 or 12 months of the year because of the climate. Arizona always had this vision of bringing water into the central part of the state, essentially Maricopa and Pinal counties that was the thought. But in the meantime, they were developing projects on the Gila River, Salt River, Senator Hayden Dam so that Yuma could have water projects and so on. But the big goal was to get the water allocated to Arizona under the Santa Fe compact into the central valleys of the state.

Q: When CAP started then it was mainly for irrigation, right?

A: That was the thing that bothered my brother and I as the project matured on went a long time. I must have testified three or four times to Senate and House committees when I was Secretary of Interior on behalf of CAP. We presented it that was the way it was prepared as a Reclamation project, as a project for farmers, as a project for irrigation and that was the main argument. If you go back and read the hearings where I testified I wasn't saying Phoenix **(FYI-tape at 16:48)** wanted to decide it wanted to be another Los Angeles, it will need water. Tucson wants to grow, it will need a lot of water and this project is for cities and not for farmers and irrigators and it took so long by the time the project was passed through Congress and financed and built, #1 the water was so costly the farmers couldn't afford it and #2 the cities were going to need it for this explosive growth that was taking place in Phoenix and Tucson.

Q: Was the CAP, was it something that really, really was needed – you got to have the CAP – or was it not needed or was it a political thing?

A: The Central Arizona Water Project became the most costly project in history of the Reclamation in the west, more costly than the Central Valley Project in Washington. The Central Valley Project in Central Arizona and the Columbia Project in ah...it was very costly. But Arizona had to have it in order to make use of water unless you could have had another Phoenix grow over from Parker to Yuma along the Colorado River and that was never feasible. You had to bring the water into the farms and communities in the center part of the state and that would involve pumping up hills of course, out of the river. It was a major project and it became a very difficult project to get approved and it became very costly project to build.

Q: At some point with so much struggle and everything else, I think you suggested why doesn't Arizona just go it alone, just figure out a way. Was that your idea?

A: I was never a "go it alone person." This project was too big, too costly. There were Arizona politicians during the 20s and 30s, I remember hearing them talk as a high school kid of saying, "Well if California thinks that they can take all of our water and so on, we will build a project of our own." That was never feasible, it was too costly. Arizona was a small state, only one congressman up until 1940. So I proposed this plan called the Southwest Water Project as a way, I knew it was a long shot and I knew it would probably fail, but tapping the Columbia River which is the, in terms of volume and water, it dwarfed the Colorado River. We said we will take 5% which would have been 5 million acre-feet a year but Senator Jackson, who was then the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Church from Idaho, and the Oregon congressman, they said no way. If you let these people tap into the Columbia River, no telling. They immediately opposed it and it was almost dead on arrival, but I proposed it because it helped me say to the California people, "look I'm not against California, I'm trying to help augment the river, that was the idea." I think the conversation or the dialogue that took place showed that I wasn't just selfishly looking at Arizona interests. I was trying to augment the river for all the states in the basin.

Q: What were the biggest problems or challenges faced by the people trying to push CAP through? The biggest problems of trying to get it through besides then California...

A: The biggest problem just to put it cold turkey was getting a bill of this magnitude through the House against the opposition. As it turned out, not just California, but the new environment movement which of course I was one of the leaders of the movement, and the Sierra Club had become a national organization and they were determined that if you were going to build these two dams, Marble Canyon and Bridge Canyon, that would violate the National Park concept and they are mounting a national campaign so that became the biggest obstacle. Now the

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, of course, is delighted to see this become a big environmental issue because the longer the project is delayed or if it was never built, they could take a surplus of water that was really Arizona's water. And so that environmental argument became the big obstacle after the Supreme Court decision in 1964, 65, and 66. Could you get a bill through the House of Representatives where you had two members of Congress out of 435 and California had by then had 30 odd members? We had to get some of the leaders, top leaders of California viewing Arizona and its desire for a water project as something that was rational and historically right and so on. I had to work on it. I worked on it every day one way or another it was always on my mind.

Q: You, if I understand this correctly, you actually warned the people, the Central Arizona Project Association, that you better make friends with the conservationists. You better prove that you are not going to destroy anything, did they pay attention to you?

A: Yes, they did. I think some were skeptical in the beginning that I had become an environmentalist. I was an environmentalist leader so I was taking the position supporting the Sierra Club's campaign and that colored my thinking. Actually, what colored my thinking was my feeling that although I knew the bill swept through the Senate, Senator Hayden had that all wired from the beginning, every Senator owed him something and he could pass a bill any day through the Senate, but could you go through the House if there was a major national conservationist controversy and that's what the Sierra Club was stirring up. And they were very effective at that point in history. And so I felt that had to be compromised, you had to dump the two dams that were proposed in the Grand Canyon area and that's what I decided to do as a strategy in the summer and fall in 1967. I took that as a national position by the Interior Department that the dams would not be built and we would build instead an electric power plant at Page which was necessary to provide the power to pump the water up to the central valleys of Arizona.



Q: You must have had some really interesting reactions to that proposal?

A: Well that, I want to say this, the SRP moved right in because the logical thing to do was to have them, a public power entity, build the electric power plant in Page and provide the power, the cheap power, to pump the water up hill to Phoenix and on to Tucson. And that, we had to put that together in a hurry. We had less than a year to get it put together and I must say the California Electric Power Company, Southern California Edison, Pacific Gas and Electric in San Francisco, they could have opposed this and they didn't because I worked with them on project they liked, like building a direct current inter-tie from the Columbia River to California to bring enormous quantities of power when it was needed from that Columbia Hydro system. So there was a lot going on and it was hard for some of the Arizona people to understand and I think with a lot of advice from my brother and John Rhodes that we played our cards correctly and we ultimately passed the bill in the fall of 1968 just before Senator Hayden and I were going to leave office and disappear.

Q: The power plant was also set up, it was set up it was kind of unusual, it wasn't just a federal plant, it wasn't just federally funded?

A: We built the mold to build the Page Plant, the electric power plant, part of it owned by the Federal Government – Federal Government building a covert electrical power plant. This had never been done before. That's the reason people thought I was betraying Arizona when I said we are going to dump the dams because on all western irrigation projects, you had to have a hydro-dam to provide the power to pump water that was needed and to provide revenues to pay for the project. So they said this is a different approach. I never had any opposition from the old budget bureau, that is now the OMB, those people because they knew I had worked hard for eight years. They knew that we were doing something that was nationally approved and not building the dams in the Grand Canyon and I got their support to put money into this active power plant.

The SRP and others had to put up money and make a commitment too but the plant was built and it has been a success.

Q: What did dumping the dams and building the power plant, what did that do for getting CAP through finally?

A: Well see, if you didn't have electric power authorized as part of the project, not just building the canal system, the pumping system to get the water, you had to have power that was relatively inexpensive to man the pumps, there is one system you don't just authorize canals, you have to have something to provide the pumping power and that is where Page Project was crucial and we put it together in less than one year. And that was pretty miraculous when you think about it. The SRP played a very vital role in stepping forward and saying we will build the plant, we'll help raise the money to finance it, and so on. So this became a crucial element and that's why we could slide it through the House in 1968.

Q: People still out there mourning the two dams though or did they all decide yeah it was right?

A: Some of the Arizona power people, Arizona Power Authority, and some of the farmers; I'm afraid who didn't fully understand why I did what I did. I don't think they ever forgave me completely, but we got the project and that was the important thing. Whether some of them were critics of mine or thought I made a mistake didn't matter, the strategy was to get the project approved by Congress and passed, and financed.

Q: Talk a little bit about the Indian issues as far as the CAP is concerned? There was a lot of (inaudible)

A: Well that, by the way, was sort of a counter wait because we didn't...John Rhodes, Mo and I in the testimony, we presented the work that we did. Well sort of, they called it "throwing an Indian blanket over the project." Because the Gila

River Indians, the Tohono O'odam Indians down there in Tucson and so on, we "wooed" them into the project that they would be beneficiaries see. They didn't have to pay the money back under the federal law and they benefited tremendously from this. My brother and I and Barry Goldwater were very pro-Indian and still are, you know and so on that did give it the appearance that it wasn't just some selfish project for white farmers who were raising cotton, that the natives were going to develop and the natives in the desert have benefited enormously from the creation of the project and bringing water in that they could use to grow crops.

Q: You talked a little bit about your Pacific Southwest Water Plan, did it ultimately, obviously there were a lot of revisions in it, did it ultimately help or hinder getting the CAP?

A: No, the Southwest Water Plan...a lot of people immediately were critical of it. What's Udall trying to do here? And what I was trying to do is present to the Colorado River Basin States and particularly to California the idea that I was not only not adverse to, we called it augmenting the water in the river, that river, relatively speaking the water is so precious that amount of water was so limited for all these projects that were being planned that if there was some way you know the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) talked about cloud seeding and other projects to increase the flow of the river. Well, if we could have brought water from the Columbia River, the BOR people, I've talked with them, of course they always wanted to build the next big project, they were enthusiastic and we quickly developed this plan but I was shot down almost immediately by the Columbia River senators and congressman from Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. They didn't want anybody fiddling around, dipping into their river and they made it very plain and clear. So it had a short life, but thought the dialogue that it produced was good and I know that Gov. Pat Brown of California, Senator Engle, thought that it was a positive idea so if you all can get it through it would help everybody and not just Arizona. It would help Nevada and California and even the upper basin states because you would augment the river and there would be

additional water for everyone. So it was a dream and I recognized at the time I put it forward, I was the one who had to announce it and get it up out front that it was probably doomed but I think it helped the project. I mean it helped Arizona, overall, by showing that we weren't closed minded to doing things that would help other states because when all of this went forward, I was seeing I had a national office, I had to be very careful about being perceived as a Secretary of Interior for Arizona. I think that helped give it a broader aspect and show we were thinking of the region and not just of Arizona.

Q: Okay, when we were talking...You were telling us about this river trip you took in 1967, when you were checking out some of the when you. Actually, tell me about that again and how did it influence were your thinking was...

A: The Sierra Club in the winter of 1966/67 mounted a national campaign, full-page ads in the New York Times, Washington Post, very skillful campaign; I mean this wasn't just David Brower. He had very skillful PR men and these ads they put in really electrified the eastern part of the country. What are these people, Arizona people, trying to destroy or impair the Grand Canyon National Park, one our crown jewels of our national park system. I was worried about it. John Rhodes and my brother, Mo, were worried about it. I thought you know, the Arizona people made the argument, oh this is a false argument, were not building dams in the Grand Canyon were building dams, Marble Dam was upstream of the Grand Canyon so it would flood a little bit of Grand Canyon but so what. So I began to think and talk to my advisors and talk to the BOR people about dumping the dams, taking them...they were in Senator Hayden's bill those two dams to provide cheap hydro power to pump the water up into the canal up to Phoenix and beyond. And so I decided to take a trip and study it. And I went through in the summer of 1967, July I think it was. I took my family with me and at the Grand Canyon National Park I arranged a float trip through the Grand Canyon so that I could study the effects recreationally, environmentally, and in terms of water and so on, of these two dams. I studied it and I came out and wrote an article for Adventure Magazine with photographs. They sent a photographer along with me,

in which I said from a recreational stand point compared to Glen Canyon Dam this was minuscule in these deep canyons to have relatively small reservoirs and that also what I decided to propose as Secretary of Interior, as a national officer, we weren't going to do this. We weren't necessarily giving into the Sierra Club, we were deciding that it wasn't necessary and that is wasn't feasible or practical because in terms of recreation, this was very small compared with...the shore line. I found out of the Lake Powell behind Glen Canyon Dam was as large as the national coast line. I mean the recreational potential was huge compared with these two dams built into narrow canyons. So I changed my position, I came out against the dams. I immediately saw, because I knew that was the consequence that we had to have another source of power and we put the electric power, the coal fired electric power plant in Page, Arizona, we developed it, got it approved, the Federal Budget Department, I got them to go along with it. That became the substitute for the dams in the Grand Canyon.

Q: During all this, as you are making decisions on let's kill the dams, let's do the power plant, let's do other things. Were you in conflict with Senator Hayden or were you working with Senator Hayden and also your brother?

A: Well there were people, including Democrats, who privately were saying well Stewart Udall isn't doing what is best for Arizona and he is in conflict with Senator Hayden. Senator Hayden and I were never in conflict. I don't remember ever him calling me over because he was the key man, he's the chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Everybody in the Senate owes him a vote and he would pass the bill overwhelmingly. I never had any confrontation with him where he said, "what are you doing here you dumped the dams, I want the dams." I think he respected the fact I was developing the strategy and I thought this was best and if we were going to get the project through while he and I were there, we were both going to leave office at the end of 1968. He didn't run for re-election, I was going out after eight years under two presidents because President Nixon had won. I was going to go out anyway so to use our power that we had, our political power, we had to get it through in 1968 and I think Senator Hayden's

attitude, he never talked to me about it or complained, was if Stewart thinks this is the way we got to go then let's do it, let's get the project done now.

Q: Did you ever think it wouldn't go through that it would never pass?

A: I never had depressed feelings that we were going to lose. This is in part because the Senate had passed the bill overwhelmingly. This was in part because John Rhodes who deserves an enormous amount of credit and my brother too, they were, they had so many things in the House. They were powerful congressman and they kept telling me we think we can get the votes, we think we have the votes. Boy, they worked intensely on it but the battleground was the House not the Senate. Getting the votes in the House to pass the bill was absolutely crucial.

Q: Was there any one person you think had the most, the most influence in making the CAP a reality?

A: I would like to discuss it on two levels because getting a major project of this kind approved by the Congress, authorized that's the term we used, is stage 1. Stage 2 is getting the appropriations to build the project and the cost was so staggering. We presented this as a, in the 60s, as a project that was going to cost less than a billion dollars. I forget the figure. It ended up \$2 million, and you had to get angle appropriations for a period of 12-15 years and I think if there is any single person that I would single out is probably John Rhodes because you had to get it in President Nixon's budget. He didn't have particular affection for Arizona although Barry Goldwater was always influential, but getting the appropriations was a major thing that he and my brother had to do...If there's any person that I would single out that probably stood out in the crowd getting the authorization and the appropriations, it was Congressman John Rhodes.

Q: Looking back, is there anything that you would have done differently or somebody else should have done differently?

A: I don't have any regrets. I haven't second guessed myself. We got it done. Although I am somewhat dismayed that it didn't turn out to be a project for farmers as much as cities, I just love the Arizona desert. I spent a lot of my time...I was a congressman from Tucson. I think the desert is such a wonderful environment. I hate to see Phoenix expanding out, out and out into the desert. I see environmental problems connected with that. And to have the water to grow, grow, grow and that's part of what has happened. I never thought that when I was a congressman in the 1960s that I would see the Phoenix metropolitan area rival Los Angeles. I feel it's something of, I have ambiguous feelings about that. I will put it that way.

Q: Well along the same line, is the CAP going to be enough? Should it have been like a bigger project especially now that we see how big Phoenix and Tucson have gotten?

A: Now we are talking in the fall of 2003, Phoenix has just had this enormous hot summer. Howard Pyle gave it the title "Valley of the Sun." Well, it's becoming the "Valley of the Fiery Furnace." You're creating a heat island in the desert and that still can be pleasant in the winter, but for people who are living there year round, if they don't go outdoors, if the temperature for weeks is 116, 118, 120 degrees it may be going up more and you have to stay in under air conditioning. I don't know, that maybe that's one of the regrets CAP – ultimately made this super expansion in the desert possible the kind of growth they've had. I left Phoenix in part because I wanted the quiet that I'd have in Santa Fe, but I didn't like the California freeway style of growth developing and I had a lot of regrets about that.

Q: Right now in 2003 we're in a year's long drought and everything else, is that ultimately going to affect the CAP?

A: Well, of course the drought, and it's not over yet in 2003, makes the water that's available less. It creates a situation where if growth is to continue you can't look to

the river, you have to look to, I mean you can't look to the SRP which of course sustained the growth for a long time but you still maintain cotton fields and orange groves and a lot of agriculture. Claire Boothe Luce, I used to quote her, she and her husband used to come to Phoenix in the winter and she said it was like coming to a garden. Well, you're not coming into a garden in Phoenix now and that causes me a lot of second thoughts.

Q: Did ultimately do you think the CAP turned out to be a good idea?

A: Well, I think the way the politics of it worked out, was it since they divided up the water of the river and Arizona was entitled given the entitlement to a portion of the water that to say that Colorado or New Mexico you know California doesn't put a drop of water into the river, they just take it out. That was the "coup" that they accomplished when Herbert Hoover got the upper Colorado states to agree on a plan to divide the river, but if we're going to divide it up, it was hard to make an argument, that for anybody to make an argument that Arizona should be one state that shouldn't be able to bring the water from the river into their valleys to use for whatever purposes they wanted. Now we told them it would be agriculture that is turned out to be urban primarily that's one of the contradictions that developed as the project went on.

Q: Do you want to make any predictions for the future of the CAP?

A: Well, the project is in place. The water users are repaying for the project under federal law that's vital. I like the fact that some of the Indian tribes, Gila River in particular, are getting, using a lot of the water for their purposes mostly agriculture. There are good things to be said about the way the project has worked out but my brother really got it extended to Tucson. Tucson would be in trouble today if they didn't have this water to augment their underground pumping water. They are much more thrifty in using water Tucson is then Phoenix. Phoenix is pretty lavish and pretty wasteful in my opinion. Lawns don't belong in the desert, they don't



belong in Santa Fe or Albuquerque or the Valley where I live now. The desert is the desert and it might ultimately reclaim parts of its domain if their drought continues.

Q: What problems relating to Arizona water resources do you think are the most critical right now?

A: Well the water issues, the most critical is the effect of the drought on the plateau in my opinion. The fires, you know, any big city needs a recreational playground, Phoenix needs it and Tucson needs it. The White Mountains and the areas up on the plateau are or have been a wonderful playground for people. The national parks that Arizona has, the Grand Canyon is still very crucial part of Arizona ambiance and integrity. I'd say so the drought is taking a bit out of Arizona environment and people ought to recognize how important it is to use water wisely and thriftily and stretch it.

Q: We talked about the drought and they need to pay attention to the drought as the future, as a challenge and everything like this, what do you see as other future challenges? Say all of the sudden the drought is gone, there'd have to be...?

A: Well the big challenges I've seen, I see that CAP, central Arizona, bringing augmenting the supplies that would come from the Salt River and the Gila River and the dams on these two rivers and the question is, "is the water that is brought in used wisely and uh, I'm worried about Arizona's future." I'm worried that it's too much of a sprawling city Phoenix and Tucson to a lesser degree, I'm worried about Southern California when cheap petroleum is gone. I wish they had done what Northern California did and build a very good public transportation system. I see, I see a crisis there that is coming in terms of transportation and that's a result of the sprawl. I think Phoenix is too sprawled. It's still growing. I don't like to see that, but the water's there to help it grow but ultimately someone was telling me the other day when I was there, the thing that saves Phoenix in the summer is the swimming pools. Everybody can have swimming pools. I guess a lot of our CAP water in the swimming pools but what's the quality of life if it's too hot, if it's really

hot. And Phoenix and central Arizona are more subject to heat than southern California. At least they are near the oceans. They get the ocean's breeze as part of the air and so the big quality of life's problems though are related to water and the use of water and that's what worries me.

Q: My last question, any advice for CAP?

A: Well they...I guess my advice to the people in central Arizona where this enormous growth is taking place is slack it off a bit. Do things that will make living there year round more enjoyable. Don't press on with growth that is going to produce, generate heat just because too many people, too much asphalt, too many cars, and so on. You got to start thinking about good public transportation systems, about a climate where people can walk and enjoy life year round. And that you're not just concentrating all summer on your air conditioning units. Big problems are there and in some way the CAP has exaggerated these problems.

Q: So maybe your advice would be for them to change the way they do things or what?

A: Well, I've given enough advice I guess for one day.

Q: Anything about the CAP that I should have asked you?

A: No, I think you've covered it pretty much. I think you've covered it. There have been books, there'll be more books written about the way the political fight developed and the way Arizona conducted its fight for its water project. And I think there still a lot of books that are going to be written that will explain exactly what we did and why we did what we did and whether it was a good idea or a bad idea. I don't expect every decision that I made to be praised as a sound decision. We were having to make decisions in a hurry in the 1960s as I've said, if we hadn't of passed that project in 1968 Arizona might never have got its big water project approved by the Congress of the United States.

Q: Could have been that somebody else was going to be a more clever politician and they were going to beat it.

A: Well this...it was teetering there in 1967, 1968. One thing there was no point in me covering it because it was just an incident but Aspinall he had a way. He was such a powerful figure, he would have the committee adjourned before Congress quit. And say well our work is finished and Senator Hayden thought, I think correctly, that if he was not going to bring out a bill out of his committee that there would not be a bill in 1968. And so he put the CAP in an appropriation bill after Aspinall went home and he came screaming back and made a promise that he would hold hearings and report on the bill in January. In the general picture...

Q: In those final, some of those other, the hearings and the subcommittee hearings, I guess Rhodes was up there playing a lot of good cards too, wasn't he?

A: Yeah, that's right. I said when John Rhodes died, the Republic...

Tape ended.